Indeterminacy in-decisions – science, policy and politics in the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) crisis by Hinchliffe, Steve
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Indeterminacy in-decisions – science, policy and politics
in the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) crisis
Journal Item
How to cite:
Hinchliffe, Steve (2001). Indeterminacy in-decisions – science, policy and politics in the BSE (Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy) crisis. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 26(2) pp. 182–204.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/1475-5661.00014
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Indeterminacy in-decisions – science,
policy and politics in the BSE (Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy) crisis
Steve Hinchliffe
Increasingly, non-human geographies have unfastened nature from its foundational
moorings. In a parallel development, the benefits of adhering to precautionary and
participatory forms of decision-making have become common place in
environmental geography and in government policy. And yet, on closer inspection,
there is a danger in these latter approaches that old certainties regarding non-human
natures remain unquestioned. The result can be a tendency to gravitate towards
bureaucratic and technical solutions to, or closures on, what are, first and foremost,
political and open-ended problems. This paper uses an empirical engagement with
BSE-related scientific and policy practices, along with insights from non-human
geographies, science studies and poststructuralism to suggest that such certainties
and resolutions are misplaced.
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Introduction
Increasingly, geographers are developing under-
standings of human-nonhuman relations which
emphasize their mutability and their contestable
status (see Anderson 1995, Braun and Castree 1998,
Whatmore and Thorne 1999, Wilbert 2000). This
work, which notably engages with literatures in
feminist science studies (Haraway 1991 1997) and
sociology (Latour 1987 1999), brings into focus the
’unnatural’ quality of a strictly ’human’ geography
(see Murdoch 1997; Wolch and Emel 1998;
Whatmore 1999a). The result has been a willing-
ness to discuss ’nature’ issues, not as matters that
lie outside our societies and that need to be
brought into the fold, nor as matters that are
already thoroughly cultural, but as living relations
with all their differences, discontinuities and
entangled formations (Whatmore 1997; Hinchliffe
2000a). Meanwhile, as concern grows over a raft of
possibly unprecedented environmental changes,
over ’new’ genetic technologies and over a range of
environment-related food and health issues, there
is new impetus to develop our understanding of
bio-geographies (see also Whatmore 1999b; Castree
1999).
The implications of this work for environmental
politics and policy have been and continue to be
matters for debate and experimentation. And yet,
despite the work of Wynne (1992, 1996, 1997),
Darier et al (1999) and Burgess et al (2000), a
tendency remains in government departments and
in some policy-relevant academic writing to treat
nature and environment as matters of fixed iden-
tity. The result, which is well illustrated in the BSE
case, is that there is little or no consideration of the
extent to which nature can be known. Instead, the
task of government and of environmental policy-
makers seems only to make sure that the best
representation of nature is made available at the
time of making a decision (with any failure to do so
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being a result of underdeveloped science or of
political failings). Once represented, the immutable
and incontestable character of a natural entity will
form the basis for a consensual approach to
decision-making (for a version of this approach to
environmental politics, which is central to the
politics of the Third Way, see Giddens 1998). In this
paper I demonstrate that the failure to take up the
lessons from environmental geographies has had
and continues to have serious consequences. I will
argue that the BSE crisis was in part the result of a
failure to acknowledge the mutable and contested
nature of the disease. Furthermore, this overstating
of the degree to which the uncertainties surround-
ing human-nonhuman relations can be reduced in
future remains a common feature of public policy.
Indeed, the BSE Inquiry and its final report tended
to reproduce this sense of determinate uncertainty.
In short, the contested politics and geographies of
human-nonhuman relations continue to be down-
played.
The background to this paper is a partial engage-
ment with the British Government’s BSE Inquiry
(held in 1998 and 1999, and which reported to
Ministers in October 2000). One immediately obvi-
ous impression of the inquiry was the almost total
absence of what would normally be recognized as
social scientists from the Inquiry team or indeed
from the list of those who gave evidence.1 This is
not to say that social science issues were absent
from the evidence or from the analyses of the
Inquiry. But it is worth noting that the approach
taken was somewhat different to current themes in
contemporary geography and the social sciences
more generally. It is a conviction in writing this
paper that there are concepts and approaches cur-
rent within geography and the social sciences that
would have been relevant to the Inquiry (see
Stengers 1997 for a useful definition of ’relevance’).
I include in this respect current understandings
of openness and indeterminacy (Wynne 1992;
Mazis 1999; Deleuze and Guattari 1994; Massey
1999b), relationality and materiality (Latour 1999;
Whatmore 1999a; Hetherington and Lee 2000) and
dialogical and political conduct (Shotter 1993;
Rydin 1999; Mouffe 2000; Hinchliffe 2000a; Thrift
and Dewsbury 2000; Holloway and Kneale 2000).
Each of these understandings can, I will argue,
offer important insights into the production of BSE,
and by extension other environmental, science and
of course food-related, crises. In demonstrating the
potential importance of these works to a major
public policy issue, this paper also adds to debates
in geography over the policy relevance of geo-
graphical work and methods (see Martin 1999 2001
and Amin and Thrift 2000). Contrary to Martin
(2001), I aim to demonstrate that the geographical
’postmodern and cultural turns’ offer significant
potential for re-engagement with political and
policy practices.
In focusing upon indeterminacy, materialities
and conduct, the paper also engages with the
variety of works that are subsumed under the
labels ‘actor-network theory’ (ANT) and ‘feminist
studies of science’ and the recent encounters
between the former and post-structuralist philoso-
phies (see Hetherington and Law (2000 for a
review). The approach taken is both informed by
these debates and modestly marks an attempt to
take some issues forward through its empirical
interest in the science and policy of BSE. In
particular I adopt Rheinberger’s (1997) notion of
‘epistemic things’ and Mazis’ (1999) notion of a
‘knowing of indeterminacy’ to operationalize fur-
ther the potentially fruitful relationship between
ANT and post-structuralism.
Finally, there is a concern here with the nature of
participation and democratic politics as it is con-
structed within geography and in particular within
environmental debate. There has been a tendency
to assume that wider forms of public participation
and broader deliberation in science and environ-
mental controversies will automatically generate
better policy decisions. Whilst it is fair to say that
in certain situations a broader constituency is evi-
dently warranted, the elevation of deliberative and
participative democracy to a general rule risks
losing sight of the power relations, antagonisms
and exclusions that make such forms of democracy
possible (Mouffe 2000). In this paper I use the
example of the conduct of BSE decisions to dem-
onstrate the importance of considering the style of
democracy as well as its constitutive elements.
After introducing, in the next section, debates
over the proper conduct of environmental and
science decision-making, I develop two case stud-
ies of BSE decisions in action. The first focuses
upon the laboratory science that was drawn upon
in policy debates to inform approaches to the
disease. The second takes a particular set of events,
as they were mediated by the BSE Inquiry, when
policy responses to the recognized onset of BSE
were being debated. Both accounts share a concern
with what is involved in taking a decision, and what
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such decisions produce in their wake. Finally, in
placing these two decision-making situations next
to one another, I hope to demonstrate that ’what
went wrong’ in the BSE case was not simply ’good
science’, which was let down by ’bad policy’ (an
increasingly prevalent reading of the official BSE
Inquiry, or Phillips, report). Rather, there was a
combined failure to translate a ’knowing of inde-
terminacy’, or a geographical understanding of
social and natural difference, into suitable actions.
1. Open science and policy?
In 1997, the British government’s Chief Scientific
Advisor, Robert May, drafted a paper entitled ’The
use of scientific advice in policy making’ (May
1997). The paper was in part a response to the
perceived problems of a disjointed relation-
ship between science and policy that had
become evident during the Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in Britain in the 1980s
and 1990s. May emphasized two issues. First, there
was unlikely to be one science that could
unequivocally inform policy. There was, at least
in the medium term, bound to be scientific (or at
least, epistemological) pluralism. Second, scientific
knowledge claims would be accompanied by
uncertainty.
May’s response to this plural and uncertain
world was to recommend that scientists should
become more involved in the framing and con-
tinual re-assessment of policy. Scientists would
best be able to handle a range of scientific opinion,
understand the various forms of uncertainty, and
develop the grounds for deliberative decision-
making and/or consensus formation. In other
words, a one-off provision of scientific advice
should be replaced with an integrated decision-
making forum, which included scientists at many
more points in the policy process (from formula-
tion, to processing to implementation). In addition,
the aim would be to develop a more procedural,
iterative approach to policy.
In a separate, though clearly related, set of devel-
opments, which many date to 1980s’ debates on
marine pollution in Europe (see O’Riordan and
Cameron 1994), scientific pluralism and uncer-
tainty are linked to prescriptions that are in part
designed to avoid the risk of procrastination and
the stalling of policy implementation through
appeals to uncertainty. The prescriptions are often
collectively termed ’the precautionary principle’
(O’Riordan and Jordan 1995, O’Riordan 1995). The
latter extends conventional policy thinking in at
least two ways. First, the timing of policy action is
brought to the fore. The recognition of long-term
uncertainties has led to a problematization of not
only how to act but also when to act. Second,
the recognition of plurality is taken beyond the
traditional scientific institutions in order to incor-
porate a wider range of expertise, including lay
and practical knowledge communities (see also
Irwin 1995). Thus, for O’Riordan (cited in ESRC/
GEC 1999, 17), there is a set of decision-making
rules which should be followed in order to act in a
precautionary fashion (see Box 1).
Box 1: Elements of a precautionary approach to
environmental and science policy – after
O’Riordan (ESRC/GEC 1999, 17).
1. Where unambiguous scientific proof of cause
and effect is not available, it is necessary to
act with a duty of care
2. Where the benefits of early action are judged
to be greater than the likely costs of delay, it
is appropriate to take a lead and to inform
society why such action is being taken.
3. Where there is the possibility of irreversible
damage to natural life support functions,
precautionary action should be taken irre-
spective of the foregone benefits
4. Always listen for calls for a change of course,
incorporate representatives of such calls into
deliberative forums, and maintain trans-
parency throughout
5. Never shy away from publicity and never try
to suppress information, however unpalat-
able. In the age of the internet, someone is
bound to find out if information is being
distorted or hidden
6. Where there is public unease, act decisively
to respond to that unease by introducing
extensive discussions and deliberative
techniques
In essence, O’Riordan and May offer up a more
complex version of policy making than was preva-
lent in the days when science was thought to
operate as a an unequivocal ‘answering machine’
(Rheinberger 1997, 32) that could be called upon at
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will by decision-makers. Accordingly, scientific
knowledge should no longer be considered as
something that can necessarily be produced to
order. The result is a partial rejection of any linear
model of science-policy practice, whereby theoreti-
cal questions are generated, knowledge is pro-
duced and policy, which is consistent with this
knowledge, is generated. Scientists and other rel-
evant parties ought, in these critical takes on policy,
to be drawn into the decision-making process in
more explicit and extended ways. Outcomes will
only be beneficial to the extent that they reflect
something of this expanded and prolonged partici-
pation and that they consider acting in the absence
of definite understanding of all the consequences.
It is worth noting at this point that the need to
recognize scientific pluralism, and the requirement
for ’in house’ scientific advisors who could provide
continuous monitoring of scientific developments,
are prominent recommendations of the final report
of the BSE Inquiry Team (the Phillips’ Report, BSE
Inquiry 2000). Similarly, calls for the application of
a precautionary approach to public and environ-
mental health issues are a prominent feature of
the report and its media reception (ibid, see also
Bradley 2000).
Persistent problems
With what are undoubtedly improved conceptions
of knowing and policy-making processes, precau-
tionary approaches introduce a set of ideas and
prescriptions that highlight knowledge plurality
and uncertainty, broadening participation and the
requirement, in a world where consequences of
inaction can be severe, for proactive policy. How-
ever, for all the talk of change and despite renewed
interest during the BSE Inquiry, there are elements
in this pluralist, deliberative and precautionary
decision-making model that remain problematic
and unresolved and that should be of concern to
geography. They give rise to three persistent prob-
lems. I will translate each problem into a question
that will be addressed in subsequent sections.
First, there seems little analysis of how the
precautionary/deliberative model actually works
in practice. It is a normative model, being a state-
ment of what should happen, given the possibility
for an ’ideal speech situation’. Looking at the
model gives us very little sense of the situated
conduct of policy. If we follow the action a little
more closely, we might find that the model is
unhelpful in taking us from current practice to
more useful formulations of policy and decision-
making processes. In particular, following those
geographical practices and performances that are
not only situated in the world, but also actively
make worlds, or situate the world, seems crucial if
an over generalized form of politics is to be
avoided. So the first question is, do specific policy
and scientific practices give us a handle on the short-
comings of policy and of the limitations of current
normative models?
Second, whilst precautionary approaches to
policy-making can be accompanied by models of
the natural world which play down determinate
cause and effect knowledge, and speak of irrevers-
ibility, indeterminacy and contingency, there
remains a tendency to objectify nature and trans-
late indeterminacy and contingency ‘into problems
of deterministic uncertainty’ (Wynne 1997, 137). In
other words, uncertainty is recognized only to the
extent that it relates to the as yet unknown aspects
of nature as substance. Alternative understandings
of indeterminacy work with notions of probability
that are not simply concerned with the risks of
being ’right’ or ’wrong’. In Mazis’ terms;
Probabilities function as explanatory principles, a way
of representing the notion that entities are processes
rather than substances, irregular in their unfolding,
open to other events, fluctuating in their identity, a
knowing of indeterminacy. Such entities are never really
anywhere, as discrete, self-founding beings, and the
probabilities represent the gaps in their substantiality
and in the Cartesian world, rather than designate a
paucity of knowledge about the system described
(1999, 226 emphasis added).
Given the predominant reading of indetermi-
nacy in environmental policy circles (an indetermi-
nacy or uncertainty of knowing rather than a
knowing of indeterminacy), we are left with a form
of realism based upon a pre-existing natural
world.2 The participative, deliberative decision-
making model can all too easily become a means to
adjust and or reject various representations of that
single world, in order to reach the best available
outcome, which is itself finally arbitrated by the
uncompromising external nature. This form of
epistemological pluralism, combined, as it tends
to be, with a substantive nature, or a natural
universalism, produces two interrelated outcomes.
First, the goal of rationalizing human choice
through progressive understanding of a pre-
existing natural world, remains. The result is that
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the power of human cognition to eventually deter-
mine and predict the natural world is largely left
unquestioned. Whilst there is no logical inevitabil-
ity of following understandings of causality with
prediction and control, the enlightenment assump-
tion of human control over nature remains. Second,
the notion of a singular natural object or physical
risk around which there are multiple perceptions
suggests that, in time, and through appropriate
procedure, a consensus and or closure on the
problem under consideration is possible. In hold-
ing up the possibility of an object-centred agree-
ment, uncertainty is reduced to being largely a
problem of making accurate representations. Even
though, in the precautionary model, it is incum-
bent upon decision-makers to act in the absence of
formal closure, the sense is that expert panels,
consensus conferences, citizen juries, and so on
will manage to reduce, rather than expand, uncer-
tainty over time. A consequence of this is to con-
tinue to underestimate the significance of the vari-
ous aspects of incertitude (as, for example,
indeterminacy and contingency). It is also to down-
play the significance of social and natural inter-
relations, and by doing so reduce the sensitivity
towards social and natural diversity. Taken
together, there is a reduction in the degree to which
other legitimate concerns, values, materialities and
experiences can count in the longer term (see
Wynne (1996 and 1997) for arguments on uncer-
tainty and on the failure of reflexive modernization
to take up the challenge of social and natural
diversity). This requirement to consider the plural-
ity and relationality of natures as well as societies
underpins the second question for this paper. How
can a reconfigured understanding of nature inform
policy?
The third persistent problem, which is present in
precautionary and deliberative models, is the con-
tinuation of an essentially bureaucratic, rationalist
decision-making framework that neglects to say
very much at all about the politics of policy. If
politics makes its way into these debates it tends to
do so through particular constructions of the politi-
cal. Interest group pluralism and deliberative
democratic processes are both imagined in ways
that tend to make political choices and actions
sound like cosy negotiations and/or a benign
means of reaching ‘the best possible decision in
terms of the public good, through argument and
practical judgement’ (Jacobs 1997, 225). O’Neill’s
rationalism is indicative of the latter approach:
Through common deliberation, the citizens may show
better sense than the best of individuals. Such common
deliberation is a necessity in the modern world. Given
that a variety of knowledge and practices inform many
choices, it is only through such common deliberation
that rational policy is possible. Moreover, good
practical judgement, the product of local and concrete
experience as well as training in theoretical abstract
disciplines, are requirements of rational ecological
policy (1993, 141).
Whilst proponents of deliberative democracy
promise more than compromise, and are gratefully
aware of the risks of moulding or presuming a
consensus, there is an assumption that a procedure
for reaching an inclusive agreement can be
approximated. Agreement can be reached, protago-
nists argue, through an appeal to a rationalized
logic, which may be a form of communicative
rationality and which often, in the environmental
sphere, implicitly relies upon a universalized,
external, nature. In this sense, and unlike the forms
of radical democracy that have been usefully elabo-
rated upon by Mouffe (1993 2000), and spatialized
by Massey (1995), there is very little consideration
of the spurious bases for rationality in and exclu-
sions of liberal democracies (for an exception,
see Rydin (1999). Mouffe’s (1999a, b) reading of
Schmitt is particularly useful here. In brief, part of
the argument runs that democratic forms are exclu-
sive at the moment of inclusion. Therefore, there is
an often unspoken tension in those models of
deliberative democracy which have as their aim an
inclusive, rationally achieved, morally informed,
agreement. Such agreements, or decisions, can only
proceed through an exclusion of an array of non-
agreeable matters (humans, non-humans, experi-
ences and so on).3 In this, decisions are, as their
etymology suggests, also cuts, or incisions, and
therefore perform distributions over what does
and what does not matter (Serres 1995; Law and
Mol 1996). Whilst these distributions are thought
to be amenable to optimization by those who
champion a participative and/or rationalist
decision-making framework, for Mouffe, conflict
cannot
either be reduced to a conflict of interests, to be
managed through negotiation – as in the model of
interest group pluralism – or visualized as resolvable
through rational deliberation thanks to the adoption of
an impartial standpoint, as in the deliberative model. In
both cases what is foreclosed is the properly antagonis-
tic dimension, the dimension that would preclude the
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possibility of a rational solution (Mouffe 1999a, 5).
Any consensus, solution, or closure, will be an
expression of a hegemony and ‘the crystallization
of power relations’ (Mouffe 1999b, 46). Therefore,
the deliberative democratic aspects to current con-
structions of an ideal policy situation are in danger
of reducing politics to a cosy pluralism or talking
shop. In doing so, they will miss the multifaceted
ways in which power relations, difference and
antagonisms can and will be felt and expressed
over and through any conflict and its so-called
decisive solution. A third aim or question is how can a
political process that seeks to remain open to contest, to
refuse deliberative or any other form of closure, inform
the policy process?
The geographical practices, the natural realism
and the spatial politics of policy-making will all
feature in the following two sections. In these, I
engage with some of the science and policy-
making that accompanied and framed the BSE
crisis in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s. Section two
follows the production of decisions over the scien-
tific nature of BSE and related diseases. It raises the
issue of the status of non-humans in knowledge
production and thereby challenges the sense of a
passive and universal nature waiting to be deter-
mined and drawn into the social world. Section
three is devised as an attempt to clarify on matters
of decision-making in policy, and similarly chal-
lenges this division of natural and social worlds. It
highlights the exclusions that are collaboratively
and dialogically performed by policy decisions and
the ways in which those exclusions are, tempo-
rarily and disastrously, rendered invisible by
appeals to technical rationality, material function-
ality and universal natural properties. The failure
of those decisions to recognize the sociality of
natural objects (that is their ability to make
associations), and the spatiality and temporality of
those associations, results in the intensification of
risks rather than their amelioration. Together, the
two sections develop into a commentary upon
current understandings of the environmental
policy process.
A note on methodology and sources
The case study material for this paper has to a
large extent been drawn from the archives and files
of the BSE Inquiry, which took place in London
from March 1998 to December 1999 and which
reported to Ministers in October 2000. The Inquiry
involved 138 hearing days, 630 witnesses giving
one or more written statements and 333 people
giving oral evidence. The majority of this and other
departmental information has been made publicly
available, much of it in electronic format currently
available at the BSE Inquiry web site (www.
bse.org.uk). According to the Inquiry Chair, this
collection constitutes a unique archive, allowing
public access to the substance of advice to Govern-
ment Ministers, and to the processes through
which the advice is formulated (BSE Inquiry 1999).
However, it should be noted that many of the
documents are undoubtedly mediated through a
judicial or quasi-judicial framework. That is, from
minutes of meetings at government departments to
oral evidence given at the Inquiry hearings, a
degree of reflexivity as to the legal implications of
any form of account helps to frame not only what
is said but also what is recorded.4 I am therefore
dealing with texts which are not only strongly
circumscribed but are also evidently cross-
referenced to form paper trails where responsibil-
ity for statements can easily be dispersed through
an organizational framework. The analytical diffi-
culties in using this archive should not therefore be
underestimated.
Meanwhile, and in addition to the complex,
inter-textual nature of the record, the archive is
vast. Therefore, for practical purposes, there is a
focus on particular episodes and on particular
issues. It is fair to say that these particular takes on
events are not necessarily indicative of a broader
picture, or necessarily more significant than other
episodes. Yet, neither are they random selections.
They have emerged from a long process of follow-
ing controversies, arguments and debates through
the empirical materials that were available. I was
aided in this through the use of the Inquiry team’s
’factual accounts’ as initial familiarization devices.
The factual accounts are arranged according to
specific events and organizations that make up the
crisis (including for example, the events leading up
to the ruminant feed ban, the role of Central
Veterinary Laboratories and so on). They contain
specific reference to Inquiry evidence, written
statements and oral evidence, which, in many
cases, can then be accessed electronically. Using the
accounts as the first port of call was therefore a
means of ordering the Inquiry’s documentation
and of prioritising analysis. They enabled, for
example, the identification of moments in the
inquiry when things didn’t add up or where there
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were serious questions over a particular account of
events or item of evidence. From this point, I
would follow up the issue as far as possible
through various paper trails and attend the Inquiry
hearings on those days when key people were
expected to be giving evidence.
In order to handle the large quantities of text and
to build up cross-referenced accounts of policy
events I used the navigation and theory build-
ing capabilities of Atlas-ti, a computer package
designed to facilitate qualitative data analysis (for
a review and critique see Crang et al (1997), and
Hinchliffe et al (1997). Finally, in addition to
material that was directly relevant to the Inquiry,
other scientific writings were consulted and added,
where possible, to the textual database.
2. Experimental systems and the
materialities of decisions
The BSE debacle in the UK gathered momentum
in the late 1980s, reached a peak in terms of press
coverage in 1990 and 1996, and continued to
produce media debate into the present (Miller
1999; Ratzan 1998; Woods 1998). One of the char-
acteristic features of policy and media debate
throughout has been the legitimacy and relevance
of scientific advice on the disease (Miller 1999;
Winter 1997). In terms of policy model, every
effort was made to (be seen to) follow a linear
model of decision-making (ideas making science,
making policy). Committees were convened and
staffed by eminent scientists (the Southwood
and Tyrell committees and SEAC, Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, are all
examples of this reliance on science). Neverthe-
less, this was not an exercise in scientific plural-
ism. The scientific advisors were chosen not for
their experimental awareness of the disease but
for their ’non-territorial’ expertise. For example,
scientists with considerable experimental experi-
ence at the Neuropathogenisis Unit in Edinburgh
were made peripheral to the initial policy debates
on the disease, and there was a deliberate deci-
sion to exclude anyone who was involved in the
controversies over disease agency (Lacey 1994;
Pennington 2000). This geography of knowledge,
which involves the systematic exclusion of those
involved in (scientific and funding) controversies
(and particularly those labelled as ’controversial’)
from policy debate, is something that has con-
cerned May (1997) and the BSE Inquiry. But there
is another aspect to this exclusion, an aspect that
relates to a different geography of knowledge.
Exclusion of experimental scientists from debate
produced, I will argue, a tendency to downplay
the practical, material and situated aspects of
disease knowledge. And it was this kind of
experimental, situated knowledge which could
produce what I earlier referred to as a ’knowing
of indeterminacy’.
Experiments and epistemic things
We have begun to understand . . that the pair human-
nonhuman does not involve a tug-of-war between two
opposite forces. On the contrary, the more activity there
is from one, the more activity there is from the other.
The more ... [a laboratory scientist] works in [their]
laboratory, the more autonomous [their] ferment
becomes (Latour 1999, page 147).
As cranial dissections of clinically affected cattle
proceeded, the symptomatic, the visual, the struc-
tural and then the molecular characteristics of the
unsympathetically named ’mad cow disease’ were
recorded. Who knows how many diagnoses
occurred before the disease was recognized as a
singular entity – as a disease rather than an unex-
plained fatality here, or as a strange variety of
something else there? There are procedures in
place for vets to record and compare experiences
and to seek advice. This was one function, at least,
of the regional veterinary centres and the state
veterinary service. In time, and to cut a complex
and no doubt controversial story short, animal
health experts moved from the recognition of an
unclassified set of symptoms, to a new disease
(based on similarity of symptoms) to a classifica-
tion of the disease as a TSE (Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy). At and before this
’point’, similarities were drawn in terms of clinical
symptoms between the new disease and sheep
scrapie. The latter had been endemic in British
sheep for well over 200 years (it was first detected
in the early eighteenth century). It was also reason-
ably well studied.
Scrapie had always been something of a mystery.
Whilst its symptoms were well known, even to the
extent that various clinical strains were recognised,
its transmission was far from clear. Over the course
of the twentieth century, attempts to understand
disease transmission tended to make the identifi-
cation of discrete disease agents the priority.
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This normally involved the ’purification’ and
biological/ molecular/ biochemical character-
ization of a replicating ‘life’ form. In other words,
the disease was expected to have a particular
(micro-)spatiality. Discrete entities were expected,
to which primary properties and agencies could be
attributed. To this end, there was a tendency to
equate the transmission of disease with the con-
veyance of nucleic acid in stable form from one
individual host to another.
The ’central dogma’ of molecular biology
undoubtedly informed a good deal of the experi-
mental work on scrapie and related diseases
(Keyes 1999a). Crick’s formulation of this dogma,
stating only that sequential information could pass
from nucleic acid to nucleic acid, or from nucleic
acid to protein, but not from protein to nucleic acid
or from protein to protein (see Crick 1958; Keyes
1999a), set the scene for James Watson’s more
prescriptive assertion that, as the slogan had it,
’DNA makes RNA makes protein’. Watson’s linear
and one-way flow of biological information pre-
vailed throughout the 1960s, and into the 1970s –
periods in which theories of replication and
genetics brought molecular biology to the brink of
disciplinary pre-dominance.5 Nevertheless, and as
I will detail, the framework of virology and the
central dogma cannot be described as determining
the scrapie experimental science. The virological
stories about the agency of scrapie did not hold up
in the laboratory. For some reason, the infectious
agents were ’objecting’ to the stories that were
being told about them (see Latour (2000) for this
definition of objectivity). To understand these
objections, it is useful to consider what else is
involved, other than stories, in experimentation.
For the biologist and historian of science,
Rheinberger, experimental systems are the genuine
working units of contemporary research in which
the scientific objects and the technical conditions of
their production are inextricably interconnected
(1997, 2). Furthermore, it is the activity of experi-
mentation, its embodiments and conduct that are
the conditions of possibility for new knowledge.
This active sense of the production of knowledge is
quite different from the idea that science proceeds
through the generation of abstract ideas, followed
by experimentation. Experiments have for too
long been regarded as constituting instances of
verification, or corroboration, of refutation, or of
the modification of theories . . . as mere empirical
instances in the evolution of theoretical proposi-
tions (Rheinberger 1997, 15).6 In an earlier paper,
Rheinberger sets out his alternative understanding
of experimental systems.
The trajectory of an experimental system can be con-
sidered to consist of a progressive reproductive refine-
ment, and of a series of bifurcation points. It is
characteristic of such bifurcation points that at the very
time when a decision has to be made as to which of the
possible lines of inquiry to follow, the information
necessary to anticipate all the possible consequences of
the choice is usually not in place. This is an intrinsic,
epistemic characteristic of the research process, and
it cannot be reduced either to an individual mind’s
competence for judging a given research situation, or to
the particular circumstances of a local research environ-
ment with its facilities or impediments. Therefore the
future of an experimental system is never the future of a past
alone: it is a series of events that is underdetermined by that
past (Rheinberger 1996, 411, emphasis added).
In order to evoke some of the historial7 materiality
of these experimental events, Rheinberger adopts
the term epistemic thing. These are scientific objects,
‘whose unknown characteristics are the target for
experimental inquiry’ (238). For Rheinberger, fol-
lowing epistemic things, rather than following
scientists (Latour 1987) or, before the sociology of
science, following scientific theories, provides
opportunities for reducing our reliance on subject-
or object-centred versions of scientific trajectory
(see Latour (1999) for a similar, if distinct project).
Far from being pre-existing entities, epistemic
things are produced in and co-productive of
experimental systems. Epistemic things are not
simply matters that can ′be brought to light
through sophisticated manipulations’ (Rheinberger
1997, 28). Paradoxically, epistemic things embody
what one does not know. They are vague and they
are absent in their experimental presence. They
present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible
vagueness. As I will show in a moment, in terms of
TSE science, they are the strange textures and
mixtures that didn’t fit or perform in accordance
with the central story of molecular science.
Rheinberger’s interest in objects shares a good
deal with others who have sought to take prag-
matogony (or the genealogy of scientific objects)
seriously. But what Rheinberger seems to offer is a
more explicit sense of the creativity, or spatio-
temporal multiplicity (see Massey 1999a), of
experimentation. For Rheinberger, science in action
involves more than the drawing together of texts,
apparatus, money, ideas, humans and nonhumans.
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This attention to ’drawing together’ that becomes
the focus of at least some forms of network analy-
sis (especially those that tend to objectify the noun
network rather than highlight the relationality of
the verb net-work, see Law (1994) tends to presup-
pose a closed system. That is, in some (perhaps
more epistemological) versions of Actor Network
Theory (ANT), a truth claim can to all intents and
purposes be explained with reference to the vari-
ous associations that made it possible. But in this
kind of exercise, there is no excess – and therefore
there is no clear room for the radically new. Indeed,
any ‘thing’ or process that looks new or innovative
is re-described as an effect of a wider set of rela-
tions or network. Now, excess seems to be some-
thing that we need to associate with scientific
activities in our times. As Rheinberger notes, ‘we
would not have the incommensurable plurality of
the sciences as we experience – and fear – them
today if their movement were not excessive, if they
were not continuously producing a surplus that is
beyond what we may have wanted, beyond what
we may have been able to imagine’ (1997, 23).
So for Rheinberger, experimentation is ‘an embod-
ied disclosing activity that transcends its technical
conditions and creates an open reading frame for the
emergence of unprecedented events’ (ibid 31, emphasis
added). The experimental system, to be successful,
is therefore a machine for generating the future
(not the exposition of the past). In contrast to the
traditional view from the philosophy of science,
experimentation is not equivalent to ’an answering
machine’. As Latour (forthcoming) and Stengers
(1997) would concur, it is the question generating
machine of science. It is a moment of risk taking, or
of not being in total control, and of finding the
conditions of possibility for being fundamentally
affected by the world (see Latour forthcoming).8
The case of TSEs helps to illustrate this facility of
experimental systems.
TSEs in the science laboratory
Since the scrapie agent multiplies in the host animal, it
has been assumed that nucleic acid must be a part of its
structure. However . . our data strongly support the
conclusion of Pattison that this agent is likely to be of
an unusual nature (Alper et al 1966, 283, cited in Keyes
1999a, 11, emphasis added).
As I stated earlier, TSE research was largely organ-
ized through the discursive practices of virology
and molecular biology’s central dogma (Keyes
1999a; Ridley and Baker 1998). In classic reductive
mode, the search for an agent progressed through
activity trials that were performed as a series of
productions and reductions in scale. Over many
years the most infective parts of animals with
scrapies were identified through these experi-
ments. Aided by filtration apparatus, centrifuges,
sterilising equipment and a huge number of small
mammals, including mice (later transgenic), guinea
pigs, marmosets and chimpanzees, workers gradu-
ally produced filtrates, precipitates and superna-
tants with higher and higher activity rates (or
ability to produce infection in a host animal – see
Ridley and Baker (1998) and for a review of the
animal stress caused in experiments on transgenic
mice see Jenkins and Combes (1999). Despite this
experimental ’success’, the ’agent’ was behaving
badly in terms of the central dogma. The necessary
features for a pathogen were seemingly missing.
Tests on the infective scrapie material in the 1960s
and 1970s suggested an absence of nucleic acid.
The inferred result being that disease transmission
was being caused by an unconventional agent with
neither DNA or RNA in its make-up. This absence
of a sequential, informational coding molecule in a
disease agent was regarded as heresy by a majority
of scientists.9
It is worth re-visiting Rheinberger’s character-
ization of experimental systems at this point. The
materialities of the experimental system, and of the
epistemic object, along with the open reading
frame adopted by these experimental scientists,
created the conditions necessary for a bifurcation
point (Rheinberger 1996, 411). This was a moment
where conceptual and material undecidability
produced the conditions of possibility for novelty.
The experimental science was not, contra Doyle
(1997), a functive series of operations, disciplining
the epistemic object so that it became a matter of
reference. Rather, an event was taking place,
wherein the ‘object’ was ‘objecting’ to the normal
utterances that were being made about it (see
Latour 2000). Such a bifurcation required a practice
that was at least as conceptual (belonging to an
irregular and open reading frame) as it was func-
tive (a disciplining mode of organising knowledge
– see Deleuze and Guattari (1994). In other words,
the experimental science associated with TSEs
could only proceed with an irregular, if bounded,
approach. The epistemic object mattered. The
experimental object was not simply narrated
into being, and scientists were not in control. The
Indeterminacy in-decisions–science policy and politics in the BSE crisis 9
decisions made in laboratories were complex pro-
ductions – that is they folded together subjects and
objects, concepts and materials (see Stengers 1997).
In short, the substance produced in the labora-
tory according to technical conventions was not
entirely what was expected. But the bifurcation
point was by no means a revolution. There were
plenty of attempts to rescue Watson’s linear model
of information transfer in the face of these experi-
mental problems. For example, preparations of the
agent were dogged by so-called impurities that
‘could well be masking the infectious agent’s true
properties’ (Keyes 1999a, 16). And indeed, whether
scientists looked for nucleic acid or not, the spatial
logic of ’true properties’ remained. The idea of a
discrete agent continued to inform the epistemic
objects produced in the laboratory.
Continuing the heretical story, in the 1980s,
equipped with new experimental techniques
(including gel electrophoresis), Prusiner and col-
leagues in San Francisco were able to produce an
infective fraction that was predominantly if not
solely proteinaceous. An acronym, Prion – small
proteinaceous infectious particles (Prusiner 1982,
1995) was assigned to this unusual disease agent.
In some senses, the experimental object was start-
ing to stabilize and to take shape. Even so, the
noun and the shape managed to raise a series of
new questions in its experimental setting. Indeed,
the prion hypothesis seemed to open up rather
than close down scientific conflict. One of the
key opponents to the prion hypothesis was
Richard Kimberlin (see for example, Kimberlin
1982, 1986) – who, despite the official decision to
exclude scientists involved in controversies over
TSE, was to become one of the main scientific
advisers and risk analysts in the BSE debacle.
Kimberlin was wary of abandoning conventional
thinking on disease and replication, and noted that
the existence of transmissible strains of the disease
suggested that nucleic acid needed to be present in
the agent in order to convey this strain specific
information.
Nevertheless, and despite strong arguments
against the theoretical possibility of prions,
Prusiner and colleagues continued to shuffle
materialities, trace new results, and ’purify’ differ-
ent substances in their experimental system
(although the infectious protein was so sticky and
insoluble that purification has remained no more
than a theoretical possibility). In 1982, a seem-
ingly unique protein was isolated from scrapie
infected hamster brains – a protein that was
thought to be absent in non-infected hamster
brain and which demonstrated activity rates in
keeping with dose concentration. Prusiner and
colleagues labelled this protein PrP – prion pro-
tein (Prusiner 1995). However, as the sequential
character of amino acids for this protein was
mapped out, it soon became apparent that prion
protein was equally present in infected and non-
infected brain material. The noun prion had not
only shifted to being an adjective, it also started
to lose much of its specificity. So not only did the
agent confound the linear information transfer
model which had become the central dogma of
molecular biology by seemingly having no spe-
cific nucleic acid, it also seemed to confound
another basic tenet of biology. If the sequential
character of the molecule was not determining its
pathogenic character, then another form of infor-
mation transfer was needed. The differentiation of
scrapie and normal prion protein on the basis of a
secondary fold seemed to rescue the idea of
an agent with primary properties. Nevertheless,
debates rumbled on as to the exact means by
which the scrapie prion protein managed to repli-
cate in a host body (see Ridley and Baker (1998)
and Pennington (2000) for reviews).
Indeed, scrapie and other TSEs remained con-
tentious in their experimental system. The disease
agent as epistemic object continued to generate
questions. And the challenges multiplied in com-
ing years as not only did TSEs threaten the
central tenets of molecular biology, they also
added to the growing sense of concern over the
state of food production and supply in Britain
and elsewhere (see Lang 1998; Macnaghten and
Urry 1997; Hinchliffe 2000b). Furthermore, just as
prions, like viruses before them, managed to chal-
lenge divisions between living and inert matter,
they also started to unsettle species’ boundaries
and divisions. As evidence of transspecies trans-
mission of BSE started to grow, the ’entrenched
cartographies’ of species being, or the ’spaces of
species’ identity, were disturbed (see Whatmore
(1997) for the ethico-political significance of this
type of disturbance, and Ansell-Pearson (1997) for
a detailed development of the ’reversals’ in narra-
tive that viroid lives can perform). Before I go on
to look at the attempts to stall this ’super-
conductive’ event (Clark 1997), I will summarize
what this account of the experimental system of
TSEs has provided.
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First of all, the science of TSEs most definitely
did not conform to a linear model of knowledge
production where ideas were tested through
experimentation. Rather, experimentation and the
production of ideas developed hand-in-hand.
Experiments could not be conceptualized as
answering a set of pre-ordered questions. Indeed,
there is little sense from the accounts and reports
that the experiments were predominantly set up to
adjudicate upon clearly stated questions. Which is
similar to saying that decisions in the laboratory
were not made by a purely cognitive agent, in
control of his or her experimental system. Indeed,
the ability to listen to, respond to and even feel
(albeit through a range of media and instrumenta-
tion) the vagueness of the epistemic thing was a
condition of possibility for the production of new
knowledge. In addition, and out of this open
reading frame, the experiments generated as many
uncertainties and as much ignorance as they did
answers. So, as the TSE research progressed, there
was no clear relationship between the quantity of
experimental time and the level of uncertainty and
ignorance. If anything, ignorance regarding the
disease itself, and disease in general, became more
rather than less apparent. The central dogma of
molecular biology was threatened, as were notions
of biological agency, replication, biological infor-
mation, infection, protein synthesis and folding
(see Keyes 1999a,b). Meanwhile, scientific disagree-
ment became more, rather than less, apparent as
the research progressed.
Second, there can be no appeal to obdurate
objects-in-nature in order to explain the experimen-
tal trajectory. From what I have already said, it
should be clear that the epistemic things of the TSE
experimental system were far from being anything.
They were not shapeless or hapless materials wait-
ing only to be reformed, and subject only to the
vagaries of narrative or ‘social’ fashion. Indeed,
they could be said to have had a hand in fashioning
the experimental system and were instrumental in
experimental decisions. But, neither were prions
a-social beings. If sociality means an ability to asso-
ciate (see Latour 2000), and if such ability to
associate is far from being a fixed property (so that
we don’t make the mistake of distinguishing be-
tween primary and secondary qualities – ibid.),
then prions start to lose some, but not all, of their
singularity. As their stickiness and ’impurity’ tes-
tify, prions don’t stand still. Furthermore, they can
be social within and amongst a range of animal
species. Indeed, their mobility across tissue and
species boundaries has been one of the more chal-
lenging aspects of TSE history. More than this,
prions are not simply relational matters, they can
also act in ways that are characteristic of what
Hetherington and Lee (2000), following Serres,
have termed blank figures. In other words, TSEs
generally, and prions more specifically, form one of
a number of conditions of possibility for this par-
ticular set of (diseased) inter-species associations.
In being able to cross species barriers, prions are, to
some extent at least, constitutionally indifferent to
their placement in specific or species orders. This
means that they are motile as well as mobile (ibid).
So, knowing prions is not simply a matter of draw-
ing molecular diagrams, and labelling fixed prop-
erties (although this is part of it). And it is not
simply admitting that there is more to know about
that structure or set of properties. It is also the
realization that prion sociability, and their role as
facilitators of sometimes detrimental sociability,
both in the laboratory and in other set-ups (includ-
ing of course the industrial-agricultural set up), can
exceed their known properties. Knowing prions is
therefore a knowing of indeterminacy. It is this
form of knowing, and the status of prions as epis-
temic things, that we should refuse to actively for-
get as the history of prion discovery is written.
Likewise, geographies of prion associations can as-
sist in generating a greater sense of the mutability,
and therefore uncertainty, of non-human identities.
To be sure, and as the continuing search for
’pure’ prions testifies, a knowing of indeterminacy
does not always follow from experimentation (see
Strand (2000) for a discussion of the durability of
natural realism in molecular life sciences). But, this
form of knowing, which rejects primary properties,
and diverges from a geography of self-identical
objects, was ruled out of court when experimental
scientists were excluded from early discussions of
BSE policy. In the next section, I turn to another
aspect of the BSE policy process, this time focusing
on the implementation of an industry-wide ban of
feed-stuffs that was conceived and first enacted (if
not wholly implemented) in 1988. The purpose
here will be not only to develop further the rel-
evance of these heterogeneous materialities, or
social natures. It is also to address the third ques-
tion, introduced in part 1, concerning the political
forms that are invoked in policy situations where
decisions are made in situations of appreciable
uncertainty.
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3. The politics of decisions
[In 1992, a farmer from near York, who had reported
what he suspected was a BSE affected calf] was visited
by the first Ministry vet from Leeds, who said ’Yes, that
is BSE’ clinically put a restriction order on it, and a few
days later . . a second Ministry vet took a cursory look
at the animal and said: ’It is not BSE because it is born
after the feed ban’, and said to the farmer: ’Have it
slaughtered and send it into the food chain if you want
to use it.’ (Richard Lacey’s oral evidence, BSE INQ:
tr980317, 93–94).
The ban, referred to in this excerpt, specified that
ruminant derived protein would no longer be
allowed to be fed to other ruminants (an industrial-
agricultural practice that had been common for
most of the twentieth century). The feed ban,
which was introduced in 1988, has been widely
presented as a success (Tyrrell and Taylor 1996;
Harpold et al 1998), a clear example of acting with
a duty of care, going further than the current
evidence would have sanctioned, and, by doing so,
succeeding in slowing the spread of disease in
cattle. But, as the calves born after the feed ban
attest, the precautionary policy did not halt the
disease. The case also suggests that the second
vet’s confidence in the ban was misplaced, and that
false assurances might have led to prolonged
human and animal exposure to health risks. To
understand something of that confidence and of
the other conditions which made disease transmis-
sion possible after the ban was implemented,
I need to engage in some detail with the
policy decisions. In doing so I will tease out the
deficiencies of a-social understandings of nature
and of a-political conceptions of policy procedure.
The following is therefore a partial history of a
policy, in three parts. The first introduces some
of the agonistic processes that are involved in
making a policy. I argue that precautionary policies
are a struggle to align all manner of discourses,
materialities, institutions and knowledges, making
them an inherently political exercise. Moreover,
this struggle does not result in a consensus or
agreement without there being distributions and
exclusions. So, the second part highlights the dis-
tributions that were performed by the ruminant
feed ban policy. Far from being ’total’ (as it has
been described to the BSE Inquiry by the Govern-
ment’s Chief Veterinary Officer from 1988 to 1997,
Keith Meldrum – see BSEINQ: tr991110: 101), the
policy assumed and then performed a disease
geography. In other words, the policy depended
upon a multitude of decisions over what and
where did and what and where didn’t matter. The
third part looks more closely at the denial of this
distributive or geographical work. In its presenta-
tion as the outcome of technical and internally
consistent deliberation, based on an unsubstanti-
ated though widely held view that the agency and
materiality of the disease was both straightforward
and predictable (conforming to determinable and
universally applicable properties), the ruminant
feed ban embodied a reduced sensitivity to the
inevitable indeterminacies that both pre-exist and
are brought into existence in the implementation of
policy (see Wynne 1992). The example suggests
that in order to be something other than hackneyed
slogans, phrases like precautionary principle and
open or deliberative decision-making need to be
firmly set in a politically contested and contestable
setting.
Conducting policy
At a meeting on 8 January 1988, the animal
health experts at MAFF (Ministry for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food), along with the chief vet
(then Howard Rees) and an epidemiologist (John
Wilesmith) all agreed that BSE was becoming a
significant disease. There were now 30–40 new
cases each month and the trend in the rate of new
cases was rising alarmingly. The epidemiologist
presented a case arguing that disease transmission
had primarily occurred through contaminated
meat and bone meal (MBM) and possibly tallow in
animal feed. The most probable source of this
contamination was the entry of scrapie infected
sheep, and possibly the re-cycling of BSE infected
cattle, into the feed system. The feeding of rumi-
nant remains to domestic, zoological and farm
animals was not new (it had been going on for the
most of the century), so it was the failure to
de-activate the disease agents in the processing of
animal feed that was the focus for concern. Having
noted the hypothetical status of this prognosis, and
after raising animal health and welfare concerns
and the possible implications of the disease for
human health, a precautionary approach was
agreed upon. Those present would send a submis-
sion to the Agriculture Minister, recommending
that clinically affected cattle should be slaughtered,
prevented from reaching the food chain and
farmers should be compensated to encourage
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compliance. They also recommended that further
work needed to be commissioned on the MBM
hypothesis, with a view to producing a precaution-
ary measure of removing ruminant derived protein
from animal feed.
The submission’s journey from the animal health
division at MAFF to the Minister for Agriculture
took 1½ months. On route, the paper work passed
through a number of hands, including those of
Permanent and Under Secretaries, who had
responsibilities for adding cost estimates, checking
the submission’s compatibility with other agricul-
tural policy, raising issues of a legal nature and so
on. Could farmers be compensated from the public
purse if no danger to human health had been
demonstrated? Wouldn’t this contravene the 1981
Animal Health Act? Did compensation set a
precedent for a raft of other crop and animal
disease problems and so effectively sanction fur-
ther subsidization of the agricultural sector?10
Could a ban on ruminant-derived feed be enforced
in lieu of a definitive statement on the origins of
the disease? What would the effect be on the feed
industry and on farming practices? These ques-
tions were all appended to the submission in
verbal and written form as it moved (see BSEINQ,
RFA07).
The questions spoke of concern regarding finan-
cial costs to the public (MAFF was under severe
budgetary restraint), and costs to the farm-
ing industry (as MAFF’s Parliamentary Under
Secretary put it ‘the slaughter policy . . would
undoubtedly have immediate detrimental effect on
exports’ BSEINQ: RFA07: 18). But the questions
also exhibited nervousness over the status of
uncertainties. The eventual recipient of the submis-
sion, John MacGregor, Agriculture Minister at the
time, told the Inquiry that, ‘[he was conscious of]
taking actions and then finding that they were not
justified by the evidence that was coming forward;
you would then be subject to legal actions’ (BSE
INQ: tr981202, 33). This kind of reasoning may
have contributed to the decision to take no statu-
tory action in February when the Minister first
saw the submission. In contrast, 3 months later,
MacGregor decided to act swiftly, at least with
respect to the proposed feed ban (the slaughter
policy would take even longer, as its sanctioning
required non-agricultural allies in the Department
of Health, see BSEINQ RFA07). The time had been
spent attempting to ’firm up’ the meat and bone-
meal hypothesis (with little real success), and in
discussion with feed manufacturers and renderers,
legal advisers and accounting experts. Crucially,
these discussions provided enough indication that
the uncertainties over the cause and transmission
of the disease would not interfere with the logistics
and legalities of introducing a ban. In effect, suffi-
cient allies had been made to start the implemen-
tation or better, the translation to action, of the
proposed feed ban. As the term translation sug-
gests, this alignment produced some subtle and not
so subtle shifts in the ban’s meaning.
The crucial issue for my purposes is that the
production of policy is a struggle to align all
manner of people, utterances, departments and
knowledges. The alliances furnished the precau-
tionary policy with stability, reduced its potential
costs and also allowed for the broader distribution
of responsibility across a range of agencies and
institutions. A precautionary policy does not, there-
fore, survive or fall on its own merits. It is a
networked achievement – with the result that as it
is inserted into the complex juridical and financial
world, changes will occur. This is not necessarily a
bad thing, it need not always be considered as a
watering down of content. But, as I will suggest in
the next two subsections, any active forgetting that
such changes have been performed results in a
denial of the politics of decisions, a denial that can
have disastrous effects.
Distributions
From February to May 1988, the feed ban policy
and the MBM hypothesis were being ‘firmed up’,
to use MAFF officials’ terms. Despite acknowl-
edged uncertainties with respect to the evidence
from a series of tests on feed processing plants
designed to demonstrate that the disease remained
active during feed manufacture (the testing
procedures were heavily criticized by industry
representatives), the Minister for Agriculture rec-
ommended that precautionary action was needed.
‘There was a need to be seen to be doing something
(BSE INQ, RFA07, 35). To this end, ‘a complete
withdrawal of the material in question from rations
for ruminants was the only safe option . . . the
evidence pointed to a speedy and compulsory ban of
sheepmeat material in feed for ruminants (BSE
INQ: tr991110, 10–11, emphasis added).11 There
was a decision to act. But this statement was not as
straightforward as it might at first read. Indeed, its
success as a decision was in part a product of the
multiplicity of the statement.
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As I have already indicated, a good deal of work
had already gone into networking the ruminant
feed ban so that it didn’t fall at the first fence. The
Minister’s statement was already, in a sense, a
robust statement. It was robust in terms of the
alliances that had been made, and, as importantly,
in terms of its ability to be translated into action.
For, in the months following the initial submission,
some fairly stark distinctions, marking distribu-
tions between matters of relative importance, had
been made and incorporated into the ban. A
geography of the disease, of where it might strike,
had been drawn up. As I will demonstrate, that
geography conformed to a particular cartography
of states, species and industrial practices. As I will
also show, the sociable disease agent was drawing,
and was increasingly able to draw, some rather
different maps.
First, as a result of the pre-decision discussions,
the ’complete withdrawal’ was not so complete. It
had already been qualified by the words ’from
rations for ruminants’. So potentially infected feed
could still be manufactured if it was fed to non-
ruminants. Pigs and poultry could continue to be
fed with the suspected material. Meanwhile, at that
time, the ban did not extend across the English
Channel or over the Irish Sea (the lack of reported
incidences of BSE was interpreted as no risk). So
cattle, sheep and goats, along with other farm
animals, could continue to eat suspected feed in
other European states. In short, the feed industry
could continue to manufacture the same ruminant-
derived feed products, so avoiding costly changes
to industrial and supply processes. Markets were
being protected, an activity that performed a par-
ticular distribution or geography of animal
disease-susceptibility. British sheep and cattle, fed
protein rich supplement, were the critical group.
All others, including pigs and poultry, foreign
ruminants, ruminants fed in field (even on land
fertilized with MBM derived products), domestic
pets and most zoological animals were ‘spared’ the
feed ban.
Second, despite all of this pre-statement distribu-
tive work, the Minister’s decision soon ran into
trouble when it came to worrying further about
implementation. As one MAFF official told the
inquiry, ‘the ban was completely unenforceable if it
was not voluntarily obeyed (BSE INQ, t980623,
136). The assumption was that implementing an
immediate, compulsory ban would meet huge
resistance from the farming industry, with possible
legal challenges and compensation claims. The lack
of scientific evidence was such that the outcome of
any legal challenge would be uncertain. So MAFF
officials sought to promote a degree of voluntary
self-interest within the industry and engender a
sense of deferred responsibility.12 In effect, the ban
was not presented as compulsory.
Third, this inability to enact a compulsory ban
demanded an even greater degree of agreement
across government and the farming industry as to
the importance of the ban. A series of meetings was
held in late May and with increasing frequency in
early June in order to discuss the ban with the feed
industry, wholesalers and farmers groups. In the
course of the discussions, several clarifications to
the ban became apparent. As well as not being
complete, and no longer being strictly compulsory,
the ban would not involve the withdrawal (in the
sense of ’recall’) of ruminant derived feed. The
financial, legal and logistical barriers to a recall of
stock were regarded by MAFF officials to be insur-
mountable. This meant that manufacturers, com-
pounders, wholesalers and farmers would be able
to use up pipeline stocks. In turn, the ban was not
speedy. Pipeline stocks could be delivered to farm-
ers for use by 18 July, a period of 1½ months after
the ban was announced. This ’period of grace’ was
arranged to allow the industry to adjust its prac-
tices. There is every indication from minutes of
meetings that the period would have been longer
had MAFF’s information division not raised the
matter of another important ally in making the ban
work. They suggested that any further extension to
the ban could threaten what had so far been an
favourable press reception (BSE INQ: RFA07, 55).
In the pre-ban discussions, and in further discus-
sions over implementation, alliances were being
made that had geographical consequences. The
time-spaces of the disease were being mapped
across states, across species, and across the every-
day workings of a farming industry with its com-
plex supply rhythms and modes of ordering. In
hindsight, it is easy to state that it was an ’unreal-
istic’ mapping. Factories and farms continued to
provide conditions for disease transfer. Feed for
non-ruminants continued to be mixed with feed for
ruminants. Pipeline feed stocks took a long time to
be used up (partly as a result of summer pasture
feeding). Meanwhile, the temporary and voluntary
status of the ban translated into non-urgent action
in some quarters. The list of potential boundary
crossings, from states to farms to tissues and cells,
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is a long one. The disease was sociable in ways that
were not anticipated in the ban, but also in ways
that the ban itself facilitated (in for example, the
continued exports, and in the cross contamination
of feed stocks that were nevertheless labelled as fit
for ruminants).
In order to explain this cartographical failure it
would be conventional to name and shame the
usual (social or human) suspects (see Serres 1995).
It might be argued that plural interests, repre-
sented in the meetings and memos, produced an
agreement with which everyone could live. Indeed,
there can be little doubt that some MAFF officials
were concerned to protect the commercial interests
of the various parts of the feed industry (especially
exports), and that various elements of the feed
industry lobbied MAFF officials publicly and pri-
vately. To be sure, there is no intention here to let
these characters off the hook. But there may well be
more to the ruminant feed ban than this, and
possibly more to politics than the representation of
and negotiation between established interests. To
demonstrate this, I want to make two arguments.
First, the policy owed as much to dialogics as it did
to the representation of interests. Second, in order
for a decision to be reached through a dialogue,
certain assumptions about the material character
and properties of the disease became established.
Thus, to reach agreement, the discussions seemed
to require a ’naturally’ stable understanding of the
disease. Any knowing of indeterminacy associated
with the epistemic object of BSE was actively
erased as consensus was developed. My argument
will be that such an erasure might have been
avoided. Furthermore, by keeping indeterminacy
in the foreground, it might have been more difficult
to discount the contested geography and politics of
the food production business.
Dialogical decisions and doses
In the hubbub of deliberation, ’interests’ look less
clear than might be expected. Elements of the
industry, for example, were both wary of the ban
but were also only too aware of the dangers of
refusing to comply. Dangers included shifts in
public and consumer sympathy and the potential
for liability should they refuse to fully implement
the ban. Parts of government, meanwhile, were
concerned that industry would not co-operate, at
the same time as being afraid that they would
implement the ban with too much vigour, so rais-
ing the public profile of the disease (see BSE INQ:
stat24c, 5). Further, and to compound this difficulty
of mapping interests on to interest groups, the
latter were far from being uniform entities.
Industry, for example, was made up of a complex
set of elements and relations. Renderers, com-
pounders, farmers, unions, breeders, meat pro-
ducers, pet food manufacturers, multi-nationals,
private abattoirs, and so on could not be relied
upon to toe one particular line. Even discrete
industry associations like UKRA (the UK
Renderers Association) and UKASTA (the UK
Agricultural Supply Trade Association) found it
difficult to represent the full range of their mem-
bers’ interests, and could not, of course, represent
those renderers and agricultural suppliers that lay
outside their organizations. Similarly, MAFF
included laboratory scientists, vets, accountants,
permanent civil servants and government minis-
ters who were organized into a fairly robust hier-
archical structure, but one that did not necessarily
coalesce into an interest group. What this suggests
is that maintaining a steady set of interests and
matching these to desirable outcomes was by no
means a straightforward task. Rather, interests,
means and outcomes shifted as uncertainties were
discussed, deliberated and incorporated into fur-
ther actions. And, as many witnesses told the
inquiry, the speed of scientific and political devel-
opments was such that it was impossible to settle
interests and to make clear representations during
key moments in the crisis.
There can be little doubt that those involved in
policy discussions negotiated what might be in
their interests. In other words, interests were a
relational achievement. Parties second-guessed
their counterparts’ reactions to matters that they
might put forward, a form of ‘double-voiced’ dia-
logue (Holloway and Kneale 2000, 76). So, for
example, by initially making the ban temporary,
and by not insisting on complete withdrawal,
officials were hoping to win over industry, thinking
that anything more would jeopardize the whole
operation. In turn, this temporary status of the ban
along with the decision not to withdraw feed had
effects on how industry saw their interests. It
meant that when industry representatives asked
for an extension to the period in which they could
use pipeline feed, they did so, in part, because they
assumed that officials considered the disease a
non-urgent problem (BSE INQ: Stat024C: 2). The
ban’s geography was therefore not solely a matter
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of pre-existing interests, but was also an outcome
of a dialogue and of second-guessing the other’s
motives.
Most importantly for my purposes here, this
geography was dependent on another set of dia-
logically performed translations. In the midst of all
this uncertainty, the coalescence of interests was
facilitated by the storying into existence of a stable,
materially homogeneous, disease agent. As the ban
was discussed, a shared understanding of disease
transmission was produced. This was particularly
evident at a series of meetings held just as the ban
was to be introduced. At a meeting of MAFF
officials and industry representatives on 1 June
1988, the latter raised questions concerning the
assumed aetiology of BSE. Given that the disease
had not, at that time, been reported in other coun-
tries, which nevertheless received exports of British
produced feed, how could feed be the cause? The
newly appointed Chief Vet, Keith Meldrum,
argued that as Britain exported relatively small
amounts of this material and that most of the
exports were probably not fed to bovines, it would
have been unlikely for cattle abroad to have
received sufficient material to develop the disease
(BSE INQ: RFA07: 41, emphasis added). Nine days
later, at a separate meeting, the UKRA representa-
tives repeated the question, this time referring in
particular to the absence of BSE in Ireland where
there were similarly high levels of scrapie and
MBM was processed in the same way. The Chief
Vet explained the apparent discrepancy by refer-
ring to the amount of material consumed by cattle,
saying ‘BSE was dose related and . . . Irish cattle had
probably not had sufficient exposure for it to
develop’ (BSE INQ: RFA07, 43, emphasis added).
Finally, in meetings with the Federation of Fresh
Meat Wholesalers and the National Cattle Breeders
Association, both of whom had expressed con-
fusion that MBM could still be incorporated into
fertilisers and ingested by grazing cattle, the CVO
stated again that BSE was dose-related and very
little would be consumed in this fashion (BSE INQ:
RFA07, 45).
In short, there was an assumption that, in order
for an animal to contract the disease, ‘it had to
ingest a massive dose of infected material’ (MAFF
animal health expert, BSE INQ: tr980612, 146). This
account of the disease was sufficient to allow
officials to explain various aspects of the ban to
others and to themselves. The continued exports,
the manufacture of ruminant-free animal feed and
potentially infected feeds on the same production
lines, the period of grace and the use of MBM in
fertilisers – all of these made sense if the dose
required for the transmission of the disease was
’massive’.
This shared understanding caused some
bemusement at the Inquiry. In part this is because
there are records of meetings, held prior to the
formulation of the ban and with senior MAFF
officials present, where uncertainties over dose
characteristics were expressed, and even where the
idea that the dose of infective material could be
very small indeed was mentioned. For example, on
the 4 March 1988, John Wilesmith, the epidemiolo-
gist, told a meeting of MAFF officials and industry
representatives that a possible transmissible agent
had been discovered, and that the effective dose of
the disease was very small (BSE INQ tr981019: 64).
Interestingly, though the meeting was chaired by
Keith Meldrum, a senior vet and soon to be chief
vet at MAFF, the government have no record of
this presentation (the minutes were supplied by
the rendering association). During the Inquiry Mr.
Wilesmith has gone further to suggest that an
undisclosed officialdom ‘were perfectly aware of
what the likely amount, that being a small amount,
was necessary to infect animals’ (BSE INQ,
tr980731, 15). Partly in response, Keith Meldrum
has denied that such knowledge was widespread.
Citing discussions he was having at the time
with Richard Kimberlin (a well known detractor
from the prion protein -hypothesis, see earlier),
Meldrum has suggested that ‘we simply did not
know what was the dose necessary to cause dis-
ease . . . or indeed the titre necessary in that
dose . . . I was not in a position to make an
informed judgement on the issue and I did not
attempt to do so’ (BSE INQ: tr981019 67). In a later
hearing, Meldrum went further to suggest that the
possibility of a small dose being sufficient to trans-
mit the disease ‘was not the view, the corporate view
that we held at the time based on the advice that
we received from the experts. We did not know.
And I do not think John [Wilesmith] knew either,
frankly (BSE INQ: tr991110, 107, emphasis added).
The ’corporate view’, apart from being a reflex-
ive expression used in an Inquiry setting to signal
the dispersal of accountability, was one of igno-
rance. And yet, in following the policy discussions
and deliberations, the idea of a massive dose
requirement inhabits conversations and decisions.
So how did a critical area where there was clear
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scientific disagreement, and significant scientific
uncertainty, develop to become a largely unques-
tioned view that the required dose for transmission
was massive? Senior vets at the Inquiry could not
explain why they had assumed such a view to be
reasonable at the time. Alan Lawrence, from the
animal health division at MAFF, told the inquiry
that he was confused as to how such an assump-
tion could have arisen. He added, in his defence,
that his understanding had followed from a broad
consultation with veterinary and administrative
colleagues (BSE INQ: Rfa07up: para 161a, and
tr980612, 145).
This translation of uncertainty concerning the
transmission of a disease into an assumed material
character is indeed difficult to explain. As the
bemusement of Lawrence and others at the Inquiry
attests, this was not a case of a simple scientific
misunderstanding. Nor does it seem likely that this
was an elaborate and preconceived obfuscation of
the ’facts’. Nevertheless, as I have already sug-
gested, it does seem likely that the translation of
dose characteristics was politically expedient. It
helped to anchor the coalescence of emerging inter-
ests. The easiest way for MAFF officials to sell the
policy to industry and to generate a necessary
degree of consensus was to appeal to an impartial
arbiter, a knowable nature. This would save a lot of
time compared to the degree of painful explanation
that would be required to haul the policy back over
the political orderings and distributions that had
made the decision possible. Whether or not my
interpretation is justified, or even reads as far too
functional in itself, the effect of the dose clause was
to close down debate, lending false legitimacy to
preceding decisions and distributions. It is an
example of the ability and possibly the will to
shortcut due political process by referring the case
to a non-social body (see Latour 2000). In turn, it
should be remembered that the externally and
impartially conferred authority of the policy con-
tributed to the production of new conditions of
possibility for disease mobility and motility.
Perhaps most significantly, the continued assump-
tion of dose dependency meant that cross contami-
nation between feed lines was largely ignored. As
ruminant derived feed, possibly containing scrapie
and BSE infected MBM, could be fed to non-
British, and/or non-ruminant animals for some
time to come, there was potential for material from
one product line to cross over into another. This
particular danger was in fact considered in 1988,
but it was not regarded as significant given that the
disease was understood to require larger doses
than this process could generate (see Meldrum on
this mismatch between uncertainty and action, BSE
INQ stat184e). It was not until 1994 that the
significance of feed mill cross-contamination was
addressed.
There are two implications of this work that I
would like to highlight. First, the indeterminacies
of natural–social relations can easily be sidelined in
current constructions of deliberation and policy
formulation. In seeking to form a consensus, the
materiality of the disease was reduced to an exter-
nal anchor or arbiter. This recourse to a predictable
and determinate material world impeded an open
discussion of the politics of decisions, their distri-
butions and exclusions. In contrast, placing a
knowing of indeterminacy in the foreground of
policy considerations may well have helped to
impede such a singular version of dosage, and in
turn, helped to emphasize the political construc-
tion of decisions. It may have also led to a more
thorough questioning of the disease mappings that
relied upon a questionable cartography of species,
states and agricultural-industrial practices.
Second, in order to understand the construction
of policy, attention needs to be paid to the conduct,
and more specifically, the dialogical character of
policy-making. Interests and understandings were
not simply brought to the discussion table. They
were, at least in part, formed as discussions
ensued. So, the final question I want to ask is this;
would a wider constituency have produced a
better policy? My answer would be that extending
the discussion and broadening the debate may well
have introduced different concerns. Matters that
MAFF officials and industry representatives
together would have found it difficult to consider
may well have made it on to agenda (including
moral questions concerning feeding practices,
increased concern for animal welfare, lay under-
standings of risk and so on. See Macnaghten and
Urry (1997) and Wynne (1996) for such arguments).
However, this inclusion of other stakeholders, val-
ues and ideas would not, in and of itself, guarantee
that the resulting policy would have succeeded.
Indeed, if broader discussion, in the form of delib-
erative democracy, continued to have as its aim the
production of rational argument and impartially
sanctioned agreement, which was not mindful of
the inevitable distributions and exclusions that
such agreements perform, then there would be
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every chance that similar failings would be repro-
duced. The case of the dose agreement is sympto-
matic of a process that requires impartial solutions
to politically difficult problems. These are problems
where conflict and disagreement may be best
handled by keeping them alive, rather than bury-
ing them under the false hope of impartial arbitra-
tion. The contention here is simply that the forging
of a policy decision through an appeal to an
apparently uncontroversial material property is
akin to resolving differences through ‘rational
deliberation thanks to the adoption of an impartial
standpoint’ (Mouffe 1999a, 5). We need to recog-
nize that inclusion and representation are not the
only ways of doing environmental politics. Some
people and things will necessarily remain ’outside’,
and those ’inside’ will not have their differences
and antagonisms erased. To imagine otherwise is,
as I have detailed in this example, to perpetuate
what is effectively an anti-democratic notion of
social and natural control.
Conclusions
Non-human geographies have recently unfastened
nature from its foundational moorings and loos-
ened its fixed identity, at the same time as demon-
strating a ’wildness’ that is not reducible to extant
social orders. And yet, despite some important
academic and political interventions, environmen-
tal policy making tends to work with a more staid
natural order. Even the welcome developments
in precautionary and participatory approaches to
environmental decisions tend to underplay the
possibility of natural indeterminacy. In short, there
remains a tendency to assume that agreement or
consensus on issues of policy can be produced by
referring the case to an existing, or, once temporary
uncertainties are banished, soon to be existing,
natural object. I have demonstrated in this paper
that such objects fail to materialize in this form.
Even in experimental set-ups where singular ver-
sions of nature might be expected, controversies
over the materiality of TSE diseases remained. In
addition, I have made a case that the assumed
existence of incontestable natural entities can con-
tribute to environmental problems. Such objects
are a means of short-cutting due political process
(Latour 2000). In the dosage case, assumed proper-
ties legitimated a map or geography of the disease
that was effectively drawn for economic and
political purposes. Moreover, this geography relied
upon cartographies of disease that bore little
relation to the sociable mappings of BSE. Species
and state boundaries, and the space-times of
industrial-agricultural practices, were no match for
the mobility and motility of the disease.
In attempting to explain something of these
shortfalls in policy-making, and to evaluate policy
recommendations made in the wake of the BSE
crisis, I highlighted three questions regarding the
geographical practices, the natural realism and the
spatial politics of environmental decision-making.
First, by engaging in detail with a portion of the
science and policy-making that accompanied the
BSE crisis I have provided an account which
takes the situated conduct of science and of policy
seriously. In following the science and policy in
action, and in particular by following some of the
socio-materialities that made up the disease, I have
drawn attention to the events that mark science
and policy practices. In emphasizing this potential
creativity, I have also demonstrated how experi-
mental and policy systems managed to generate a
form of indeterminacy that is rarely considered in
policy debates (and was excluded early on from
the science-led BSE debates). Rather than a tempo-
rary affair, uncertainty seems an endemic aspect of
the practices that I have followed. Indeed, by
following the material relations that were
co-produced during the pursuit of pure agent, the
construction of primary properties and in the
attempts to shortcut due political process (Latour
2000), I have suggested that indeterminacy was
ironically produced at the same moment as its
denial.
Second, I have demonstrated that living and
non-living nature (and the boundaries between
such are not easily drawn) that inhabits experimen-
tal and agricultural-industrial spaces, is not one of
a kind. Nor is it social in the conventional, ‘social
science’, appropriation of the term. But it is
sociable. This may not be a recipe for an infinite
multi-naturalism, but it does suggest the impor-
tance of ‘things’ that are able to ‘object’ to science
and policy-making (Latour 2000), and object in
ways that, by definition, are open to change. Again,
the emphasis of such a conclusion lies in the
knowing of indeterminacy of these epistemic
things. Which is also to say, contrary to the conclu-
sions of the BSE Inquiry, that our failure to get the
right policies was not simply a matter of misrepre-
senting the science (although that was part of it). It
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was also a matter of scientists and others failing to
translate a knowing of indeterminacy into the
political process.
Third, precautionary and deliberative models of
decision-making can miss the multitude of distri-
butions, inclusions and exclusions, which are
endemic to experimental and policy situations. In
their appeal to externally sanctioned agreement
these political forms tend to deny the struggles to
produce policy statements and the provisional
though important ‘crystallization of power rela-
tions’ (Mouffe 1999a, 5) should such statements be
accepted. To be sure, this is not to say that the
non-agreeable matters (the human-nonhuman rela-
tions that are formed and excluded in the perform-
ance of a distribution, or a decision) can or should
be included in future decisions or agreements. In
any case, ’they’ may not even pre-exist the distri-
bution or decision, making their inclusion non-
sensical. Rather, and given the inevitability of
distributions, the argument pursued here would be
that to continue the quest for impartially sanc-
tioned decisions is to miss the significance of
taking decisions. It is the pursuit of closure, rather
than simply the exclusion of voices, that is anti-
democratic. Further, it is to suggest, along with
Wynne, that the decisionism that inhabits so much
environmental policy thought and practice is anti-
relational and ahistorical. Whilst Wynne is refer-
ring to more explicitly technical decision-making
forms than have been dealt with in this paper, a
dose of participative democracy and deliberative
decision-making does not, it seems to me, alter the
statement that: decisionist approaches leave ‘no
room in principle for recognising that the assumed
object of the decision may itself be a contingent
human construct which excludes other legitimate
concerns, values and experiences – even if these
may not be easily articulable’ (1997, 148). I would
only add that the material-heterogeneity and there-
fore mutability of such an object may also be
excluded to our cost.
Finally, in this paper I have endeavoured to
make empirically informed theoretical contribu-
tions to geographical concerns over policy rel-
evance, human–nonhuman relations and the
pursuit of inclusive forms of environmental poli-
tics. In terms of policy debates, I have demon-
strated that what may seem to be esoteric and
theoretical pursuits in academic geography are
vital to certain areas of policy-making. Indeed, it
can be productive to engage political and policy
problems with something other than modes of
thought which are solely functional, and therefore
limited to a particular machinery of activity –
functives as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) term
them – and that inhabit so much policy practice.
The openness of epistemic things and of a knowing
of indeterminacy can do some serious work in
guiding policy practice (for a similar argument
couched in a different language see Amin, Massey
and Thrift 2000). Meanwhile, and in terms of
nonhuman geographies, the paper has started to
map an alternative to the social construction/
natural reality contest. I have experimented with
natures’ (plural) sociability and hence mobility and
motility to start to outline what Latour calls social
realism (1999 2000). I have also used Latour’s
(2000) sense of objectivity and Rheinberger’s (1997)
epistemic things to underline the productiveness of
other than human embodiments. Rheinberger’s
utilization of notions of excess has enabled me to
emphasize the prospect of novelty and events in
human–nonhuman relations. Finally, I have made a
start in rejecting any simple spatial register that
seeks to include the excluded in environmental
politics. I have started to trace a politics and
spatiality of decisions that speaks of distributions,
divisions, associations, antagonisms, differences as
well as exclusions and inclusions. The result is a
sense of the production of a range of social and
spatial relations that cannot easily be wished away
through an appeal to a time- or space-less logic,
a universal matter or nature. Imagining that
decisions can be anything other than fraught and
contested, or that they can be materially neutral, is
to imagine a world without difference. It is also to
refuse those moments when natural and social
sciences produce a knowing of indeterminacy.
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Notes
1 The lack of social scientific evidence is not necessarily
a fault of the Inquiry team alone – there were several
open invitations to contribute evidence to the Inquiry
and I can only assume that most social scientists (with
the exception of Time Lang) did not take up the
opportunity. However, in the social scientists’ (and
my) defence, the Inquiry did have an air of absolute
functionality about it, which would have made social
science interventions difficult to handle. I return to
this notion of functionality in later sections of the
paper.
2 The term realism is being used in a particular way
here. Preferring to reconfigure a realist approach to
environmental issues and/or nature is not meant to
invite accusations of idealism or voluntarism. Rather,
it is meant to dispel those accounts of the natural that
imagine natural reality as something that humans do
not take part in. Likewise, reality should not be
considered as something that humans can wholly
determine. The co-production of reality, in ways that
will rarely be characterized by an equitable share of
the spoils, is closer to the process that I want to
convey in this paper. See Latour (1999, 2000) for an
extended discussion of reality in relation to the
science studies literature.
3 I take it that Mouffe’s arguments are fairly specifically
referring to a modern, Western version of democracy
and so I am bypassing the charge that this part of her
argument treats particular forms of conflict as univer-
sal features of social conduct. See Massey (1995) for a
critical reflection on this point.
4 Thanks to Sarah Whatmore for highlighting this
procedural and methodological issue.
5 There is an interesting parallel between the narrative
forms and metaphorical devices that inhyabit
molecular biology and standard theories of knowl-
edge and practice. The conventional understanding
of ‘ideas make science make policy’ clearly inhabits a
similar informational world.
6 Rheinberger’s texts are also clear as to the role of such
experimentation in the construction of historical and
social knowledge forms. It is a deficit of my own
paper that I haven’t sufficiently reflected on the
process that led to some of the arguments being
developed. I would only add that the long periods of
assembling relevant texts, following paper trails,
attending Inquiry days, trying out and triangulating
arguments and drafting papers amount to something
akin to the materially heterogeneous process that
Rheinberger and others associate with scientific
experimentation.
7 The term is borrowed from Derrida, and is used to
evoke ‘the temporal characteristics of any signifiying
activity as a process without definitely assignable
origin or ground’ (Rheinberger 1997, 239).
8 Experimental social science is similarly a machine for
generating futures. There is something to be learned
from experimental natural sciences in this respect.
Adopting an open reding frame and allowing the
‘objects’ of research to object to the trajectory of
the research is a vital lesson (see Latou 2000). As is the
ability to write this research in ways that retain a
degree of openness (a lesson that is even harder to
learn – thanks to Doreen Massey for pointing out the
question-answering style that still drives many parts
of this paper).
9 A similar resistance to scientific work that had con-
travened Watson’s linear information flow version of
the central dogma is evident in the early reception of
work on reverse transcriptase, whereby virus RNA
can encode sequential information into host DNA
before the normal sequence of replication proceeds.
Such work was largely ignored according to the
experimental scientists, Howard Temin – see Keyes
1999a, 7.
10 Of particular concern was rhizomania, a disease
of sugar beet, which was considered to have no
possible link to human ill health, and therefore farm-
ers had not been able to claim compensation on
destruction of the crop. If compensation was paid on
BSE cases in the absence of a statement on the
potential risks to human health, then this might
provoke framers to claim for similar treatment over
rhizomania.
11 The material is being quoted from a minute of a
meeting held on 18 May, following a submission by
Howard Rees, then CVO, to the Minister on 6 May
1988. The reference to sheepmeat may well have been
a slip, as the intention seems to have been to ban
bovine, ovine and caprine derived material from
ruminant feed. Indeed, the ban stipulated all three at
a later stage (BSEINQ 991110, 23).
12 MAFF officials told members of the industry that
failure to implement the ban could lead to an
intensification of the disease, would endanger liveli-
hoods and livestock and could even result in civil
prosecution in the future. Regarding the latter, there
were recent well-known precedents where the
industry’s failure to act had led to civil actions that
had cost the feed manufacturers dearly. (An example
being the case of Newcastle Disease, see BSE INQ:
tr980623 for a description of this approach from
members of MAFF’s animal health division).
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